

# PacificMUN

Dare to Speak



DISEC-Topic A  
Backgrounder Guide



## Centralized Security and Military Forces - DISEC

Topic A

# PacificMUN



### Letter from the Director

Dear Delegates,

My name is Emily Ni, and it is my utmost pleasure to welcome you to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) at PacificMUN 2019.

Ever since my first experience three years ago in a General Assembly, I've been enamoured with the passionate discourse found uniquely within Model UN. I can say with absolute conviction that the people you meet, the topics in which you gain immense amounts of knowledge, and the skills that you develop as a collaborator, public speaker, and delegate, are invaluable to you. I can only hope to instill the same passion in you, the delegate, as my directors did for me.

Serving as your two Chairs are Steven Long and Rhéa Tabet. Steven is currently a grade 11 student at St. George's school, and is looking forward to making PacificMUN a memorable experience for all. Rhéa is ecstatic to be serving as your Chair at PacificMUN 2019, and is currently a grade 11 student at École Secondaire Jules Verne.

Maintaining international peace and security are DISEC's ultimate goals. Therefore, delegates must work to draft comprehensive resolutions that maintain global stability. Both our topics are incredibly expansive topics that require thorough research and knowledge to allow for constructive debate. Therefore, I would like to stress the importance of gaining an extensive understanding of your country's stance and relationship with the topics at hand in order to allow for an engaging experience; your work as a delegate will not only benefit yourself, but the committee as a whole.





The entire dais team welcomes you to the Disarmament and International Security Committee at PacificMUN 2019. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions or concerns; we look forward to a weekend of rewarding debate.

Sincerely,

Emily Ni  
Director of DISEC  
PacificMUN 2019

## Committee Overview

On January 24th 1946, the first resolution of the First Committee, the "*Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy*" was adopted by the United Nations.<sup>1</sup>

Created in 1945 following the atrocities witnessed in World War Two, the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) plays an integral role in maintaining international security and stability. As the First Committee of the United Nations, all 193 members of DISEC play an integral role in maintaining world peace. In this committee, delegates must gain a holistic understanding of the topics and issues at hand to draft a comprehensive resolution that effectively deals with the multifaceted opinions within the expansive committee.

Ever since its inception, a newly created First Committee resolved to succeed where the League of Nations had previously failed. Since then, DISEC has grown to encompass a plethora of pressing international issues ranging from asymmetric warfare to cybersecurity. Although unable to make binding resolutions, DISEC is able to recommend effective solutions that broaden the limited scope of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Unique to DISEC is its entitlement to verbatim records coverage, the only Main Committee of the General Assembly able to do so. Its size and scope make it an invaluable organ of the United Nations, offering multifaceted opinions on far-reaching international issues. The considerations and recommendations that DISEC, as part of the General Assembly, are able to offer, are crucial to the United Nations (UN).

The most pertinent global conflicts are subject to heated debate and tentative resolution in DISEC. Most recently, the 72nd session resulted in a multitude of resolutions on topics almost as extensive as the scope of the committee itself. The committee also works extensively with the United Nations

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htm>



Disarmament Commission (UNODA), as well as numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that allow for insightful contribution to its resolutions. Along with these aforementioned NGOs, DISEC works to create stability and security all over the world. DISEC's work in the international community is with marked with significant funding. The estimated budget for 2016-2017 was nearly 5.4 billion,<sup>2</sup> and it is clear that the funds allocated to this committee have made notable changes for the better.

## **Topic A: Transnational Security and Military Forces**

### **Introduction**

With supranational organizations all over the globe taking steps towards forming transnational military and security forces, the creation of these coalitions has been reintroduced into widespread global discussion in tandem with the increasing risk of international conflict. These transnational and supranational organizations are comprised of multiple nations, and have the ability to enact change past the limits of individual actors.

The very nature of these forces is often hotly contested, and powerful intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and nations like France, have made clear their intentions to establish, or have already established, permanent collective military forces. Often, transnational issues require transnational responses: those who advocate strongly for these forces deem them an opposite countermeasure to combat global issues ranging such as terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, or information security. The EU in particular has shown increasing interest in creating a military coalition, the European Defence Union. The European Commission, a subset of the European Union, has repeatedly pushed for the establishment of a European Defence Union. Having established Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to lay the foundations for a multinational EU military force in December of 2017, President Jean-Claude Juncker pushed forward with his vision to see a fully functioning European Defence Union by 2025.<sup>3</sup>

Nevertheless, international military forces are not simply confined to governmental organizations. While less prominent than their national counterparts, privatized military corporations are often transnational in nature, having a large scope and international presence in their operations. These privatized forces must also be incorporated into discussion around regulatory measures to ensure the efficacy and transparency of these coalitions. Regulation proves to be more convoluted surrounding these private military coalitions, seeing as they often do not have a transnational framework for supranational military structures. Often having to abide by regional legislation, there is a need to streamline frameworks

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/ga/fifth/70/ppb1617sg.shtml>

<sup>3</sup> [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-5205\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5205_en.htm)



surrounding the governance of these military forces. Ultimately, whether private or purely intergovernmental, demand for centralized military forces has risen significantly.

Supranational security forces present a more nuanced sector of supranational organizations. While supranational military forces focus more on combat and active military engagement, supranational security forces provide a basis of stability across different regions. Instead of outright dealing with intense conflict, developing multinational security organizations often do not receive the same amount of support and publicity as its military sectors. Additionally, due to increasing geopolitical tensions, nations may be hesitant to join a multinational security force for fear of protecting their sovereignty or information. However, the International Criminal Police Organization, or INTERPOL, is a major renowned supranational security force. With 192 member-states, increased international police cooperation combats transnational issues. Nevertheless, in an age of increasing cyberwarfare, information theft, and transnational crime, the establishment of additional international security forces to combat these threats is a viable option to combat issues that do not deal directly with military conflict. Nevertheless, development of these security forces often lags behind that of military forces. The idea of creating a security coalition is a relatively newer idea that necessitates further discussion surrounding scope, feasibility, and regulation.

## Timeline

**May 1948** - The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization is established to bring stability to the Middle East. Although unarmed, this was the first peacekeeping operation established by the UN.

**April 4, 1949** - The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is ratified, with 12 member states signing on.

**September 1954** - The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was formed to mirror NATO, and to contain the threat of communism in the East.

**November 1956** - The first United Nations Emergency Force is established to resolve the Suez Canal crisis and mitigate conflict between Israeli and Egyptian forces.

**August 3, 1981** - After the expiry of the UNEF in 1979, the Multinational Force and Observers was established to stabilize the region during Israeli withdrawal.

**May 15, 1992** - Six post-Soviet states - Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan - signed the Collective Security Treaty.

**December 2003** - The African Standby Force enters into force. Comprised of civilian and military components, it is designed for rapid deployment.



**January 1, 2007** - EU Battlegroups reach full functional capacity, the battalion sized-combat forces are under the direct control of the EU Council.

**September 2017** - French president Emmanuel Macron proposes the European Intervention Initiative.

**11 December 2017** - Permanent Structured Cooperation is activated, with all but 3 members of the EU taking part.

## Historical Analysis

### ***EU Battlegroups***

Before the development of PESCO, the EU had established battlegroups (commonly abbreviated as EU BG) operating within the confines of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) - the universally applied security policy in place in the EU - to resolve military crises. It was developed with the goal of rapid response and high levels of readiness in mind, and in February 2004, the “Battlegroup concept” was proposed in a paper drafted by France, Germany and the United Kingdom.<sup>4</sup> On New Year’s Day in 2007, Full Operational Capacity (FOC) was achieved.<sup>5</sup> The battlegroups were developed to fit a number of missions: evacuation, conflict prevention and stabilization, initial entry force, or even bridging operations. The EU BG seemed like a versatile, readily available resource that would be a large asset to European military cohesion.

Regardless of how much promise the battlegroups showed in their earlier years of development, the battlegroups faced several challenges. This is also the reason why they have not, to this day, been deployed.<sup>6</sup> The first challenge facing the battlegroups is a universal issue for multinational military organizations: interoperability. It is imperative that transnational coalitions are able to standardize their forces’ training and skills, but without EU-led exercises, a lack of collective training, and vague criteria that is almost impossible to assess on a standardized basis, it would be much easier for nations to resort back to national military forces. The second issue that the EU BGs faced is one that present-day EU military forces face to this day: the relationship between NATO and the EU BG. The majority of countries involved in the EU BG are also part of NATO. As there is a significant amount of overlap between the two organizations, it still remains unclear how the EU BGs are different from the NATO Response Force (NRF). The EU BGs are also insufficiently funded, with the EU declaring that *“the most significant obstacle had long been the financing of EU Battlegroup operations”*.<sup>7</sup> With all these

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<sup>4</sup> <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/enter-eu-battlegroups>

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet\\_battlegroups.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_battlegroups.pdf)





challenges in mind, it is imperative that the struggles that the EU BGs faced will be addressed in future coalitions.

### ***Southeast Asia Treaty Organization***

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was an international alliance created by the Manila Treaty of 1954, signed by various Western, Southeast Asian, and Australasian nations including the United States, Australia and, the Philippines.<sup>8</sup> Created as a mirror of NATO, SEATO was designed to contain the spread of communism after recent developments in Indochina and Korea. With domino theory remaining the prevailing mode of thought, development of organizations similar to NATO became a keystone in the West's plan to contain and defeat the Eastern bloc.<sup>9</sup> However, the success of SEATO was short lived. Soon after its entry into force, their military forces were quickly proven to be incompetent. They lacked a centralized standing military force and rather relied on the individual nation-states that comprised the coalition. Their lack of a collective military was a large factor in their eventual collapse. Additionally, SEATO's framework called for individual action to address unrest seen in post-colonial times, instead of collective action and retaliation. This fragmentation of what was supposed to be a unified coalition also furthered the degradation of the treaty. By the 1970s, countries started to withdraw from the coalition as the communist threat transformed from outright aggression to passive subversion. As a result, the coalition disbanded in 1977.<sup>10</sup>

## **Current Situation**

### ***Development in the European Union***

One of the most prominent case studies for a developing transnational military force, the European Union and European Commission have recently put frameworks in place to facilitate the development of a European Defence Union. Recently, the framework for structural integration of the EU's military and defence forces was implemented in of 25 out of the EU's 28 countries.<sup>11</sup> Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) serves as a binding framework for a multinational defence system. Relatively new as it is, PESCO is the first step to developing a full-scale European Defence Union by 2025.<sup>12</sup> Due to its enshrinement into European law, it is likely that PESCO will be more likely to succeed bound by its integrated legislation.

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<sup>8</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Southeast-Asia-Treaty-Organization>

<sup>9</sup> <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/seato>

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en)

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.



**#EUDefence**

**PESCO - WHAT IS IT?**  
Permanent Structured Cooperation, treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence cooperation among participating Member States to develop capabilities and increase their operational availability.

**HOW DOES IT WORK?**

**Council level**  
25 PESCO members are in charge of overall policy direction and decision-making

**Project level**  
Once a project is adopted, those Members States involved are in charge of its management and implementation

**PESCO SECRETARIAT**  
overall support

**PESCO SECRETARIAT - WHAT IS IT AND WHAT DOES IT DO?**

- ▶ Run by EEAS (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate and EU Military Staff) and European Defence Agency
- ▶ Supporting identification and implementation of new projects
- ▶ Project assessment and support for new PESCO projects
- ▶ Supporting PESCO participating Member States

**17 PROJECTS ADOPTED**  
AS OF 06/03/2018

*A brief overview of PESCO and its system of operation.*

However, the EU plan has faced opposition and scrutiny from the American government. US Ambassador to NATO, Kay Bailey Hutchison, warned against European development of integrated defence.<sup>13</sup> This echoes a similar sentiment seen during the Bush administration in 2003, during which friction between the two major powers intensified.<sup>14</sup> The future dynamic between the United Kingdom and the EU is also important to keep in mind when developing transnational military forces, as it remains unclear whether or not the UK would be allowed to take part in an “EU” defence force after Brexit. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how PESCO, and ultimately, a unified European military coalition, would play out in the current global geopolitical landscape.

Important to note is the dynamic and relationship between the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), PESCO, future European Defence Union, and NATO. It is still unclear as to how PESCO functions in relation to NATO, with overlap between the two organizations’ mandates and motives. The transatlantic relations between North American nations and the EU will likely be affected by the EU’s shift towards an integrated military, and given the protectionist nature of the current American administration, it remains to be seen how these organizations focus on different aspects of defence.

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.ft.com/content/67ccea94-1200-11e8-940e-08320fc2a277>

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.





### **European Intervention Initiative**

Existing outside of the scope of both NATO and the EU, the European Intervention Initiative (EII/EI2) is a product of French president Emmanuel Macron's vision for the rapid development of a European military coalition. The initiative was established with the intent to form a multinational defence force that exists outside of the EU (therefore involving Britain) and would be able to respond rapidly in crises.<sup>15</sup> In late June of 2018, 9 countries signed a letter of intent to form the coalition, but there are still a number of concerns with the agreement. Key to the agreement's success is Britain's participation; France - the leading nation behind this coalition - shares a similar military view with its English government on how to best respond to crises, and it is clear that Macron needs UK support for a successful coalition. Moreover, there are several pressing issues concerning the EII. The organization's role in relation to NATO and other defence coalitions is still not clear. There seems to be overlap within their mandates, and North American concern over European military expansion that conflicts with both the EU and NATO will undoubtedly prove to be problematic. In order for the EII and Macron's vision to come to fruition, the roles and boundaries of the EII must be clearly negotiated and outlined.

### **African Union and the African Standby Force**

*"As per Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the ASF is based on standby arrangements with Africa's five sub-regions."<sup>16</sup>*

The African Standby Force (ASF), a subset of the African Union, is a regional, multinational peacekeeping force. Comprised of the North African Regional Capacity (NARC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force, Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Brigade, these region-specific subsets all thrive under the larger umbrella coalition of the ASF.<sup>17</sup> The AU is seemingly unique in its complexity; regional coalitions fall under the ASF, which is a structure implemented through the Peace and Security Council (PSC), one of three subdivisions of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is ultimately an organ of the UN.<sup>18</sup> Akin to UN peacekeepers, the ASF and PSC are responsible for:

- a. *Observation and monitoring missions;*
- b. *Other types of peace support missions;*

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/25/nine-eu-states-to-sign-off-on-joint-military-intervention-force>

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1>

<sup>17</sup> [http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/447~v~African\\_Peace\\_And\\_Security\\_Architecture\\_-\\_2010\\_Assessment\\_Study.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/447~v~African_Peace_And_Security_Architecture_-_2010_Assessment_Study.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.peaceau.org/en/topic/the-african-peace-and-security-architecture-apsa>



- c. *Intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;*
- d. *Preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement.;*
- e. *Peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization;*
- f. *Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and*
- g. *Any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly.*<sup>19</sup>

The true success of the ASF is debatable, considering the lack of clarity and organization surrounding some tactical and practical details in regards to deployment, authorization, and governance. Due to the categorical nature of the ASF, in which the force operates both regionally and collectively, deployment becomes complex when it is unclear whether or not forces will be deployed regionally or as a collective entity. Moreover, this becomes more problematic when the motives, skills, and tactical specializations of the regional units conflict with one another. The ASF must function quickly, especially in a region prone to quickly escalating conflicts. Furthermore, control over the troops is often unclear, with certain regions preferring UN authorization over the AU. For instance, SADC and ECOWAS often prefer the UN Security Council (UNSC) to authorize deployment, and this creates discord and a lack of cohesion. Therefore, they are unable to deploy forces quickly enough to combat large crises. If the ASF is to truly function as a unified entity, they must clarify and solve the issues surrounding authorization and regional management.

### **Collective Security Treaty Organization**

Also referred to as the Tashkent Pact, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is a Eurasian military bloc - widely regarded as the Eastern mirror of NATO - that developed after the fall of the Soviet Union. Comprised of post-Soviet states, the treaty included Russia, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan at the time of its inception in 1992.<sup>20</sup> Nonetheless, Uzbekistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan had withdrawn by 1999 due to their strengthened relationship with the West.<sup>21</sup> The CSTO has faced its fair share of criticism and failure, notably over its failure to intervene in the Kyrgyz ethnic conflicts, Tajik civil war, and Tajik-Uzbek conflicts. This was especially problematic, as the CSTO was unable to intervene in one of the worst conflicts the region has seen in recent history, or perhaps, it was unwilling to. The lack of participation from the CSTO highlights the disparity and lack of cohesion between member states; it is clear that there is severe conflict of

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/re-examining-collective-security-treaty-organization>

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.



interest between member states. In particular, Russia's position of power in the bloc is concerning. Much like the US' powerhouse position in NATO, Russia is a powerful nation that **asserts dominance** over its Eurasian neighbours. This could prove to be problematic if it chooses to manipulate policy to its own advantage. However, the CSTO's greatest concern does not lie in Russian aggression. Rather, it lies in the discord and disunity that plagues the very core of the treaty itself. Take the effect of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict on relations within the organization. When Russia promised an Armenian Secretary-General, it did not sit well with Azerbaijan's allies, Kazakhstan and Belarus. As a result of this tense situation, both the Kazakh President and Belarusian delegation were absent at the 2016 summit.<sup>22</sup> As much as the CSTO presents an interesting dichotomy of power between East and West, the CSTO must focus on achieving unity within its own organization.

## United Nations Involvement

As a supranational organization itself, the United Nations is no stranger to multinational coalitions surrounding global security. In fact, the Disarmament and International Security Committee serves as a pertinent reminder of the benefits to be gained from establishing these centralized forces. After all, at the heart of DISEC's mandate is the interest to preserve international security and stability.

### *UN Peacekeepers*

Moreover, unique in the landscape of transnational military organizations are UN Peacekeepers. After the UN Treaty was established after the end of World War II, there were several attempts to establish a permanent UN military force. However, tensions between Soviet and American forces prevented a permanent standing force from being created.<sup>23</sup> Instead, the UN began sending in temporary military forces that still represented the international coalition of the UN. A notable occurrence of military intervention before the Peacekeeping force was the UN intervention in North Korea. Under the US, UN forces engaged in full-fledged war against North Korean forces in the invasion of South Korea.<sup>24</sup> The first deployment of armed military peacekeepers was during the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. Canada seized the opportunity to create and implement what we know as the modern-day UN Peacekeeping force; Lester Pearson, then-Secretary of State for External Affairs, initiated the deployment of the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).<sup>25</sup> In 1957, Pearson won a Nobel Peace Prize for his work in peacekeeping.

In the 21st century, peacekeeping has proved itself to be an effective tool in resolving conflict. Although not a standing army on its own, the 14 active UN Peacekeeping operations supplied by willing member-

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<sup>22</sup> <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-russias-military-alliance-not-next-nato>

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/peacekeeping/>

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unefi.htm>





states, and spread out on 4 continents, are ultimate examples of the effectiveness of a successful supranational security force.<sup>26</sup> They are distinctive in the fact that while they exist in a multinational coalition, they are not a truly established transnational organization. That is to say, the peacekeeping force is assembled at the discretion of the Secretary-General and from various member-states' forces, "*integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates.*"<sup>27</sup>

### **Kofi Annan on Battlegroups**

During the proposal and initial development of the EU Battlegroups, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his support for the development of a rapidly mobilized battlegroup. Speaking on October 14th, 2004, he called for "*third generation' peace-enforcement operations.*"<sup>28</sup> As opposed to first and second generation operations, which were typical UN peacekeeping operations, he made clear that these bluntly militarized interventions were needed to respond rapidly to international crises. Annan's support for the proposal was one of the major initiators behind the development of what was to become the EU battlegroups.

## **Seeking Resolution**

For resolution to occur, delegates need to fully understand the pros and cons of the continued integration of military and security forces. Although there exists no problem *per se* pertaining to this topic, our world of increasing unity calls for consensus as to this matter. Therefore, the following proposed routes are not ones which have been wholly seen in the world as of yet. That is to say, delegates will have much freedom to follow their country's own ideological paradigms and create their own systems of integration.

### **Hard Integration**

Hard integration is most closely resembled by current developments towards centralization in the European Union, with initiatives such as EII and PESCO being great examples. However, investing all of a country's security and military resources are risky and not without its problems. These initiatives are often met with the most skepticism, and failures often threaten to topple the entire system. Such was the case with the EU and the UK, with its withdrawal from a proposed battlegroup over uncertainty with Brexit.<sup>29</sup> That is not to say that going this route does not have its benefits, however. Devoting resources towards developing a centralized multinational military can mean increased unity, stability, and productivity within entire regions, as has been the case for the EU in the long-term. According to the EU Institute for International Studies:

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<sup>26</sup> <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping>

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>28</sup> <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199/40947.html>

<sup>29</sup> <https://www.politico.eu/article/theresa-may-uk-military-britain-pulls-out-of-eu-defense-force/>



*“...the EU’s six military operations to date can be considered a quiet success. They have contributed to the stabilization of war-torn countries in the Balkans, stopped the escalation of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, shielded vulnerable refugees in Chad, and helped stem piracy off the coast of Somalia.<sup>30</sup>”*

It is clear that, while risky, moving towards a united multinational military can vastly increase one country’s influence beyond what it could have been by itself, while also bringing stability and unity to its home region.

### **Soft Integration**

Soft integration is most closely resembled by current and past developments within mutual defense treaty organizations such as NATO or UN Peacekeeping initiatives, often pooling military and security resources in order to achieve certain goals on a global level.<sup>31</sup> However, all of these militaries retain their full nationality and autonomy within the organization. This option is currently the most widely adopted, with most countries having some affiliation with either a defense treaty organization or UN Peacekeeping. Furthermore, this approach has proved to be the most effective in ensuring the stability and preservation of a global order, as has been the case with NATO.<sup>32</sup> However, the limitations of soft integration impede its effectiveness. Soft integration is only effective in terms of resolving issues with peacekeeping and mutual defense. Outside of these already stable issues, soft integration is often unable to combat actively aggressive threats. If the explicit goals of association are defense rather than establishing further unity and economic cooperation, this option remains as a relatively unriskey and promising one.

### **Decentralization**

Another approach more in-line with current global trends of nationalistic populism is to progress towards an opt-out from all these systems and to rely solely upon one’s own military. Though no country can dissociate its security from the security of every other country, nations currently headed by leaders seeking more sovereignty such as the US<sup>33</sup> or the UK might find this choice acceptable. However, an important note here is that multinational security systems do not necessarily result in a loss of autonomy, and that these organizations should not be erroneously associated with domination or hegemony.

<sup>30</sup> [https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief\\_41\\_EU\\_military\\_operations.pdf](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_41_EU_military_operations.pdf)

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/03/world/nato-exercise-poland-baltics-russia/index.html>

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/what-is-nato-and-how-does-it-keep-europe-safe/>

<sup>33</sup> <https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-threatens-to-pull-out-of-nato/>



### ***Sovereignty Supportive Frameworks***

When pursuing any of these solutions, delegates should always remain mindful of one of the UN's central tenets: sovereignty. Though unity and stability are of the utmost importance and a goal of this body, these ideals should never come at the cost of national identity or a country's own autonomy. Participation in all systems, however centralized, must operate by voluntary association and not by force of arms or political pressure. The final resolution regarding this topic should create a precedent moving forwards that pursues all the values of the UN. Examples of this can be found especially in the UN's Peacekeeping force, but also in the EU's CSDP, and NATO in general.

## **Bloc Positions**

### ***North America***

As large global players in military alliances, North American nations are powerful military allies and often have strong strategic stances on transnational security. NATO in particular is a powerful example of both the power North American delegations have in alliances, but also an example of the cooperative relationship between North American Western Liberal Democracies and their European counterparts. Additionally, the US is known for being the epitome of Western military might, which proves to be occasionally troublesome in alliances involving developing nations. This is not to say that they are not open to working with developing nations, but rather that North American must be careful that their influence does not evolve into that of neocolonialism. These delegations hold firm pro-West stances and are active players in transnational military organizations.

### ***European Union***

Recent developments amongst members of the European Union are extremely pertinent in the global scheme of multinational military development. These delegations are at the heart of the newfound development of security and military coalitions, frameworks, and treaties that have risen out of past attempts of establishing these forces. The European Union as a whole is on the brink of either rapid development, or stagnant proposals. The EU bloc must decide where its interests lie in terms of how aggressive it wants to be with its military forces. Is it finally time to establish a standing army for the EU, or is it a better option to continue thoroughly developing PESCO? Additionally, these delegates must keep in mind the relationship they want to foster between the rest of the Western world, and the optics that come with developing a functioning transnational force. There are huge amounts of potential for rapid development; however, it remains to be seen what the EU chooses.

### ***Eurasian Bloc***

After the collapse of the USSR, the historically communist region of the former Soviet Union has expanded into a military superpower of its own right. Notably, Russia has been a major contender in the dichotomy between East and West. However, that is not to say that post-Soviet states are not equally as





important in the fine balance the region holds. Delegates in the Eurasian bloc often seek regional stability before anything else, and improving the CSTO has long been on this bloc's agenda. Russia, as well as the surrounding states in this region, must work strategically in order to further their own agendas whilst simultaneously managing international pressure from the West.

### ***Middle Eastern Region***

The birthplace of UN Peacekeeping, the Middle East holds historic importance in transnational military forces. Born out of the original peacekeeping mission during the Suez Canal Crisis, the Multinational Force & Observers is the modern-day peacekeeping force preserving security in the region.<sup>34</sup> This bloc is rather volatile and prone to instability, with certain regimes holding opposing views on multinational military forces. Stability in the region is of utmost priority, and additional strengthening of coalitions and security would be greatly beneficial.

### ***African Union***

The African Union is also home to the ASF, a force that covers most of the continent. However, because of the sheer size and scope of the AU, the region suffers from the same instability as other incohesive blocs. The AU must come together to streamline the ASF in order to maximize efficiency. Conversely, the AU would also benefit from more regional coalitions. This bloc has flexibility in its choice, but needs to reconsider its frameworks.

### ***South America***

Countries in South America have a fair amount of flexibility in terms of creating their own military organizations, as well as deciding which countries to align themselves with. Depending on each nation's policies and views in military affairs, South American delegations will likely support broader, more international agreements to include themselves under the protection of the coalition. There is also much room for development within South America as a region, and developing a coalition much like the ones seen in Europe and North America is well within these delegates' reach.

## **Discussion Questions**

1. What developments have already occurred in relation to the creation of transnational defense and security systems?
2. What precedent should be set regarding the future of militaries that transcend national boundaries? Is this a generally good or bad phenomenon?
3. How can countries who seek greater autonomy and the ability to opt-out of these systems be protected from possible overpowering by these systems?

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<sup>34</sup> <http://mfo.org/en>



4. How can a country's military culture be preserved within the context of multinational systems?
5. Should a transnational military be limited in scope or area of operation?
6. Who/what should these systems be controlled by? A single leader country, a collection of countries, or by an organization developed specifically for this purpose?
7. How might countries still developing their militaries and economies fit into a new paradigm of transnational super-militaries?
8. Are international policing organizations more effective than solely national ones? Should they be given more power?

## Further Reading

### **Enter the EU Battlegroups: Chaillot Paper (European Union Institute for Security Studies ) - February 2007**

Comprehensive overview of the EU Battlegroups and pertinent historical analysis.

<https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp097.pdf>

### **SEATO Stumbles: The Failure of the NATO Model in the Third World: Gettysburg College - Spring 2015**

[https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.ca/&httpsredir=1&article=1397&context=student\\_scholarship](https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.ca/&httpsredir=1&article=1397&context=student_scholarship)

### **European Defence Union: European Commission - December 2017**

Press release concerning the foundation for the establishment of a European Defence Union.

[http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-5205\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5205_en.htm)

### **Operationalizing the African Standby Force: Institute for Security Studies - September 2012**

Overview and policy brief on the ASF.

<https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ASFPolBrief.pdf>

### **The EU in Libya and the collapse of the CSDP: The London School of Economics and Political Science - August 2017**

Analysis of the EU's role and actions in Libya.

[http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/83719/1/Marchi\\_The%20EU%20in%20Libya%20and%20the%20Collapse%20of%20the%20CSDP\\_Final.pdf](http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/83719/1/Marchi_The%20EU%20in%20Libya%20and%20the%20Collapse%20of%20the%20CSDP_Final.pdf)

### **Why Russia's Military Alliance Is Not the Next NATO: Stratfor Worldview - January 2017**

Comparative analysis on the CSTO, especially in relation to NATO

<https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-russias-military-alliance-not-next-nato>



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